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SUBSTANCE OVER FORM IN TRANSFER TAX
ADJUDICATION
Richard Schmalbeck and Jay A. Soled*
The elevated exemption level under the federal transfer tax system
(now in excess of $24 million for a married couple) has opened up new
and abusive tax-avoidance opportunities. In many areas of the tax law,
the substance over form doctrine historically has been effective in controlling such abuses; however, for a myriad of reasons, transfer tax jurisprudence has been marred by the reluctance of courts to embrace this
doctrine. In this analysis, we urge reconsideration of that posture.

* Richard Schmalbeck is the Simpson Thacher & Bartlett Distinguished Professor of Law
at the Duke University School of Law, and Jay A. Soled is a professor at Rutgers Business School
and directs its Masters of Taxation Program.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A well-accepted principle of tax law interpretation is that the substance, not the form, of a transaction should dictate its consequences.1
Conceived in the early years of tax jurisprudence by the U.S. Supreme
Court,2 this principle has developed into a doctrine that has a rich and
detailed heritage.3 Commonly invoked by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),4 it is an effective tool in controlling taxpayers’ efforts to
1. The United States Supreme Court stated as follows:
[T]he Government may not be required to acquiesce in the taxpayer’s election of that
form for doing business which is most advantageous to him. The Government may look
at actualities and upon determination that the form employed for doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event is unreal or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect
of the fiction as best serves the purposes of the tax statute. To hold otherwise would
permit the schemes of taxpayers to supersede legislation in the determination of the time
and manner of taxation.
Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477–78 (1940).
2. As early as 1921, in the U.S. Supreme Court’s analyses of the then recently introduced
modern income tax, the Court shied away from pure textualism. See United States v. Phellis, 257
U.S. 156, 168 (1921) (“We recognize the importance of regarding matters of substance and disregarding forms in applying the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment and income tax laws enacted
thereunder.”); see also Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924) (“Questions of taxation must be
determined by viewing what was actually done, rather than the declared purpose of the participants,
and when applying the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment and income laws enacted thereunder
we must regard matters of substance and not mere form.”).
3. In her article, Linda D. Jellum noted:
Using nontextualist approaches, the Court long ago crafted common law rules of interpretation, or doctrines, which require a transaction to satisfy both the statute’s language
and its underlying purpose; satisfying the literal words of the statute is not sufficient.
These anti-abuse doctrines collectively permit the Service to reject a taxpayer’s characterization of a business transaction arguably meeting the precise terms of a tax statute,
but simultaneously seeking tax benefits Congress did not intend.
Linda D. Jellum, Codifying and “Miscodifying” Judicial Anti-Abuse Tax Doctrines, 33 VA. TAX
REV. 579, 590 (2014) (footnote omitted); see also Philip Sancilio, Note, Clarifying (or Is It Codifying?) the “Notably Abstruse”: Step Transactions, Economic Substance, and the Tax Code, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 138, 141 (2013) (“The general principle that taxation should give effect to transactions’ substance, rather than their form, underlies much of tax law and impels many more specialized doctrines, including the economic substance and step transaction doctrines.” (footnote
omitted)); Alan Gunn, The Use and Misuse of Antiabuse Rules: Lessons from the Partnership Antiabuse Regulations, 54 SMU L. REV. 159, 160 (2001) (“For most of our tax history, attempts by
taxpayers to exploit the wording of particular Code provisions have been struck down on various
grounds: substance over form, lack of business purpose, lack of non-tax substance, and the ubiquitous if obscure ‘step-transaction doctrine.’”).
4. Insofar as the substance over form doctrine is concerned, the general consensus is that the
Commissioner has the upper hand in invocation. This sentiment was expressed by Judge Seitz in
Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967), when he declared:
Where the Commissioner attacks the formal agreement the Court involved is required to
examine the ‘substance’ and not merely the ‘form’ of the transaction. This is so for the
very good reason that the legitimate operation of the tax laws is not to be frustrated by
forced adherence to the mere form in which the parties may choose to reflect their transaction. . . . In contrast, the Commissioner here is attempting to hold a party to his
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skirt their income tax obligations.5 The familiar fact pattern that often
unfolds is as follows: taxpayers engage in a transaction designed to
reduce their tax obligations that is in compliance with the literal dictates of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) yet is wholly devoid of
economic substance; the IRS audits the taxpayers’ tax returns and proposes an assessment; the matter is adjudicated in court; and the judiciary unapologetically employs the substance over form doctrine to
characterize more accurately the putative transaction, according the
recharacterized transaction the less attractive tax consequences that it
deserves.6
But when it comes to adjudications involving the transfer tax regime—estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes, which have
played an important role in shaping the nation’s tax landscape—the
emphasis that the judiciary places on the substance of a transaction,
rather than its form, is curiously anemic.7 That absence has emboldened taxpayers to use the Code’s literal language in ways that they

agreement unless that party can show in effect that it is not truly the agreement of the
parties. And to allow the Commissioner alone to pierce formal arrangements does not
involve any disparity of treatment because taxpayers have it within their own control to
choose in the first place whatever arrangements they care to make.
Id. at 774–75 (internal citations omitted).
However, courts have occassionally granted liberty to taxpayers to invoke the substance
over form doctrine as well. See Robert Thornton Smith, Substance and Form: A Taxpayer’s Right
to Assert the Priority of Substance, 44 TAX LAW. 137 passim (1990) (emphasizing the fact that
taxpayers, too, can invoke the use of this doctrine); Ciaio v. Comm’r, 47 T.C. 447, 457 (1967)
(“The taxpayer as well as the Government is entitled to the benefit of the rule that the substance
rather than the form of a transaction controls.” (citing Landa v. Comm’r, 206 F.2d 431, 432 (D.C.
Cir. 1953))).
5. See, e.g., Est. of Weinert v. Comm’r, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961) (noting that “[t]he
principle of looking through form to substance . . . is the cornerstone of sound taxation”).
6. In his article, Peter C. Canellos noted:
Once a judge sees the transaction as a shelter, a function of inferences that experienced
judges are capable of making based on all the facts, the result is predictable—taxpayer
loses. The Tax Court, in particular, seems to have accepted the view that the strain on
the tax system would be unbearable if tax-motivated transactions had to be sustained
merely because they manage to encapsulate an uneconomic tax rule, however clear by
its terms. This result-oriented outlook resembles the approach of appellate courts, which
often strive mightily not to reverse a criminal conviction on procedural grounds where
guilt is clear. The shelter promoter who loses on a claim for unreasonable tax benefits
despite good technical arguments based on arcane provisions and choreographed scenarios does not deserve or receive much sympathy.
Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in
Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47, 65 (2001).
7. Jay A. Soled, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Resolving Transfer Tax Controversies, 42 B.C.
L. REV. 587, 599–604 (2001).
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claim support their transfer tax machinations even when the essence
of what they are doing is entirely artificial.8
This analysis offers possible explanations for the fact that the substance over form doctrine is vibrant in one context yet largely dormant
in the other. First, it explores the origin of the substance over form
doctrine and discusses its role in resolving income tax disputes. Next,
utilizing three representative case studies, this analysis examines several transfer tax–minimization techniques in which taxpayers elevate
form over substance but that the courts nevertheless approve. Third,
the analysis offers several explanations regarding the judiciary’s position and then discusses its consequences. Fourth, the analysis argues
that the sanctity of the transfer tax system requires not only that Congress consider taking ameliorative reform measures to address circumventions of the transfer tax rules but also that the judiciary be more
receptive to use of the substance over form doctrine in handling transfer tax adjudications. A brief concluding section follows.
II. BACKGROUND: THE SUBSTANCE OVER FORM DOCTRINE
Tax professionals generally understand that the tax treatment of a
transaction is to be determined by the substance of the transaction rather than by its form.9 That, at least, is the ideal—though it is not always achieved.
In the famous case of Helvering v. Gregory,10 Judge Learned
Hand articulated an elegant explanation of the ideal. In that case, Mrs.
Gregory owned all of the shares of a parent corporation, which in turn
owned appreciated shares of a wholly owned subsidiary corporation.11
Mrs. Gregory wanted to sell the subsidiary’s shares but knew that if
the parent corporation distributed these shares directly to her, this
8. For examples of this phenomenon, see infra Part III.
9. Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859,
863 (1982) (reviewing BORIS I. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS
(1981)) (“[T]here is almost universal assent among tax lawyers and theorists that the revenues
should not be defeated by certain entirely artificial maneuvers. We are assured—and it would be
hard to demur—that the ‘substance’ of events should determine their tax consequences . . . .”); see,
e.g., Craig W. Friedrich, Purchase of Stock of Corporation After Corporation Purchases Debt of
Purchaser of Stock Does Not Avoid Cancellation of Indebtedness Income, 19 J. REAL EST. TAX’N
162, 162 (1992) (“The hardest class of judgment any tax professional makes . . . is deciding when
the form of a transaction will govern for tax purposes and when some ‘substance’ discerned through
the form will control instead. Good tax professionals, having had broad experience with form and
substance issues, develop a reliable gut instinct that detailed research can focus but never really
substitute for making the final leap to judgment.”).
10. 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
11. Id. at 810.
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would constitute a taxable dividend of the full fair market value of
such shares, taxable at ordinary income rates.12
To avoid this unattractive financial outcome, Mrs. Gregory engaged in what she claimed was a tax-free reorganization.13 As part of
the putative tax-free reorganization, Mrs. Gregory employed the following four-step process:
(1) She established a new corporation in which she was the sole
shareholder.
(2) She then had the original parent corporation transfer its subsidiary shares to the newly formed corporation established
pursuant to a reorganization.
(3) A few days later, Mrs. Gregory liquidated the new corporation
and had it transfer its subsidiary shares to her (these were the
same shares that the newly formed corporation attained via
step #2).
(4) As the new owner of the subsidiary shares, Mrs. Gregory sold
them later on the same day.14
The liquidating distribution of the subsidiary’s shares (step #3)
was admittedly a taxable transaction, but only on the gain and at capital gains rates.15 From the taxpayer’s vantage point, however, all other
aspects of the transaction were tax-free, shielded under a literal reading of the Code.16
The IRS disagreed, declaring that the reorganization was without
substance and that Mrs. Gregory should be taxed as if she had received
a dividend equal to the fair market value of the subsidiary’s shares.17
The Board of Tax Appeals thought otherwise, noting that the transaction was in literal compliance with the rules regarding reorganizations.18 It therefore held that the transaction was to be respected and
that dividend treatment was accordingly inappropriate.19
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. I.R.C. § 331(a) (1934); I.R.C. § 331(a) (2018).
16. Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810 (“All these transactions being real, their purpose was irrelevant, . . . especially since it was part of a statute of such small mesh as the Revenue Act of 1928;
the finer the reticulation, the less room for inference.”).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Judge Hand’s recapitulation of the Board of Tax Appeal’s opinion is as follows:
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On appeal, Judge Hand made it clear that taxpayers are entitled to
structure transactions in the manner that exacts the gentlest tax bite.20
As he framed it, “a transaction, otherwise within an exception of the
tax law, does not lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a desire
to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Any one may so arrange
his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible.”21 But Judge Hand
went on to observe that, to be respected, transactions have to be congruous with congressional intent.22 He ultimately concluded that despite the taxpayer’s literal compliance with the Code and its provisions
covering tax-free reorganizations, this transaction did not constitute
such an event and therefore failed to qualify for nonrecognition.23 In
other words, though the form of the transaction was a tax-free reorganization, the substance was not—and the latter controlled the tax
consequences associated with the transaction.24 With the imprimatur
of this learned jurist,25 this newly crafted formulation of the substance
over form doctrine gained immediate respect within the legal community.26

[T]he Board held that the Averill Corporation [(i.e., the newly-formed corporation)] had
been in fact organized and was indubitably a corporation, that the United Mortgage Corporation [(i.e., the parent corporation)] had with equal certainty transferred to it the Monitor shares [(i.e., the shares of the subsidiary corporation)], and that the taxpayer had got
the Averill shares as part of the transaction. All these transactions being real, their purpose was irrelevant, and section 112(i)(1)(B) was applicable [(i.e., the predecessor to the
tax-reorganization provisions of Code section 368)].
Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Notwithstanding these words, modern usage distinguishes (legal) tax avoidance from
(illegal) tax evasion. For example, Code section 7201 makes any attempt to “evade or defeat any
tax” a felony. I.R.C. § 7201 (2018).
22. Gregory, 69 F.2d at 811 (“To dodge the shareholders’ taxes is not one of the transactions
contemplated as corporate ‘reorganizations.’”). The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that “[t]he
whole undertaking, though conducted according to the [statutory] terms . . . was in fact an elaborate
and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization.” Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935).
23. Gregory, 69 F.2d at 811.
24. Id. (“All these steps were real, and their only defect was that they were not what the statute
means by a ‘reorganization,’ because the transactions were no part of the conduct of the business
of either or both companies; so viewed they were a sham, though all the proceedings had their usual
effect.”).
25. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (2011).
26. Allen D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-over-Form Doctrines
in Tax Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 700 (2003) (“Judge Learned Hand introduced these
substance-over-form principles into tax law in 1934 in Helvering v. Gregory.”).
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A substantial body of tax jurisprudence has sprung from the
Gregory case. To date, more than 1,000 cases have cited it.27 What is
fascinating is that the Gregory case sits perched atop two lines of authority that rely upon it for completely opposing reasons. On the one
hand, taxpayers routinely reference it for the proposition that they are
at liberty to try to minimize their tax burden;28 on the other hand, the
IRS regularly invokes it in order to defeat abusive transactions that
exploit the Code’s literal language.29
Over the course of the substance over form doctrine’s long existence, it has achieved particular prominence in controlling abusive tax
shelters.30 No single comprehensive definition encompasses all forms
of abusive tax shelters; however, such shelters are likely to be found
“when a taxpayer reduces its tax liability by ordering its affairs in a
manner that complies with the text of the statute but contradicts the
intent of the law it purports to follow.”31 And while there are many
reasons why the substance over form doctrine has gained such immense traction in income tax jurisprudence,32 the amount of lost tax
revenue associated with abusive tax shelters is surely one of the most
compelling.33
27. Daniel N. Shaviro, The Story of Knetsch: Judicial Doctrines Combating Tax Avoidance,
in TAX STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME TAX CASES 313, 360
n.158 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003).
28. See Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810 (“Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be
as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is
not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”).
29. See id. at 811 (“All these steps were real, and their only defect was that they were not what
the statute means by a ‘reorganization,’ because the transactions were no part of the conduct of the
business of either or both companies; so viewed they were a sham, though all the proceedings had
their usual effect.”); see also Madison, supra note 26, at 700–01 (“In Gregory, Judge Hand held
that a taxpayer who has jumped through the textual hoops in the Internal Revenue Code is not
necessarily entitled to the tax benefit the text of the Code provides if the transaction or activities of
the taxpayer appear questionable. Textualism and substance-over-form as applied in tax law are
polar opposites. Under textualism, statutes should be interpreted on the basis of what the text means.
Under the substance-over-form doctrines, courts are permitted to ignore or disregard the text of the
Internal Revenue Code on the basis of economic principles or taxpayer motivation or both.” (footnotes omitted)).
30. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 5–6
(2000) (“For more than fifty years, courts have interpreted and applied the tax law with the aid of
various ‘common law’ doctrines, such as substance over form, step transaction, business purpose,
sham transaction, and economic substance.”).
31. Orly Sulami, Tax Abuse—Lessons from Abroad, 65 SMU L. REV. 551, 558 (2012).
32. Isenbergh, supra note 9, at 863 (“Most major statutes raise problems of interpretation, of
course, but the quest for ‘substance’ through the distracting haze of ‘form’ has attracted a particularly intense scrutiny in tax matters.”).
33. The revenue loss associated with tax shelter activities has been significant. See, e.g., Gabriel Zucman, How Corporations and the Wealthy Avoid Taxes (and How to Stop Them), N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/10/opinion/gabriel-zucman
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A remarkable feature of the substance over form doctrine is that
the IRS has invoked it in a broad range of other diverse settings. Such
settings include, but are not limited to, the issuance of putative annuity
policies,34 sale-leaseback arrangements,35 and intrafamily loans.36
However, while the IRS has often prevailed by invoking the substance over form doctrine,37 it is noteworthy that the agency’s track
record is imperfect,38 largely because the substance of a transaction is
often mutable or ambiguous.39 Thus, simple utterance of the phrase
substance over form does not allow the IRS to prevail merely by

-paradise-papers-tax-evasion.html [https://perma.cc/AC8Q-FT3M] (“Meanwhile, an estimated
$8.7 trillion, 11.5 percent of the entire world’s G.D.P., is held offshore by ultrawealthy households
in a handful of tax shelters, and most of it isn’t being reported to the relevant tax authorities.”);
Maria Tihin, The Trouble with Tax Havens: The Need for New Legislation in Combating the Use
of Offshore Trusts in Abusive Tax Shelters, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 417, 418 (2008) (“In
2006, it was estimated that Americans utilizing offshore entities have more than one trillion dollars
in offshore assets and evade tax payments between forty and seventy billion dollars each year.”);
Noël B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 3
(2004) (“It is estimated that tax shelters reduced tax revenues by approximately $10 to $24 billion
in 1999.”).
34. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960) (ruling that a purported annuity arrangement was a “sham” because “there was nothing of substance to be realized by [the
taxpayer] . . . beyond a tax deduction”).
35. See, e.g., Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 95 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting
that the taxpayer “did not purchase or lease a computer, but rather, paid a fee . . . for tax benefits”).
36. See, e.g., Zohoury v. Comm’r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 96, 98 (1981) (“A taxpayer is not entitled
to deduct purported interest payments to a family member made with respect to loans in form if the
purported loans are not loans in substance.”).
37. It is almost invariably the case that it is the government that argues that substance should
determine the outcome of a case rather than its form, for the simple reason that the taxpayer has
already chosen to form the transaction in a way that will generate the hoped-for favorable tax treatment. However, see supra text accompanying note 4.
38. Consider two representative cases. First, in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561,
561 (1978), despite IRS objections that the transaction in question constituted a mere financing
arrangement rather than a property purchase, the Supreme Court allowed depreciation deductions—
which are, of course, premised on ownership of the asset—for the taxpayer. Likewise, in Compaq
Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778, 785, 788 (5th Cir. 2001), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the IRS’s argument that because the taxpayer did not bear
the burden of the foreign tax, the taxpayer wasn’t entitled to foreign tax credits being claimed;
instead, the court focused on the fact that the taxpayer’s ownership interest gave rise to “both a
reasonable possibility of profit attended by a real risk of loss and an adequate non-tax business
purpose.” Id. at 788.
39. See Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a
Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1948 (2005) (recognizing “the ambiguous and untrustworthy application of the economic substance doctrine”); Bankman, supra note 30, at 11 (“Litigation involving the economic substance doctrine involves related, but in some sense distinct, litigation over the text, intent, and purpose of the statute. The precise relationship between the economic
substance doctrine and conventional statutory interpretation is ambiguous.”).
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referencing it.40 Rather, the phrase constitutes an invitation to analysis,
following which the court in question will reach its own conclusions.
III. TRANSFER TAX ADJUDICATIONS: APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
GOES MISSING
As noted, as a beacon designed to shed light, the substance over
form doctrine has played a critical role in the income tax realm, enabling courts to patrol against those things that masquerade as something that they are not, protecting the income tax base, and safeguarding the sanctity of the government’s coffers.41 Oddly, this sensitivity
to a transaction’s substance rather than its form appears to be less evident, or in any event much less successful, in constraining abusive
transfer tax schemes. Three representative families of transactions—
(A) irrevocable life insurance trusts, (B) family limited partnerships,
and (C) upstream transfers42—illustrate this puzzling phenomenon.
Each is explained below.
A. Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts
Life insurance proceeds payable to a decedent’s estate or beneficiaries are generally includable in one’s gross estate if the decedent
retained “incidents of ownership” in the insurance policy.43 Incidents
of ownership generally include the right to designate beneficiaries,
surrender the policy for its cash value, or borrow against the cash value

40. See, e.g., Johnson v. Comm’r, 495 F.2d 1079, 1082 n.5 (6th Cir. 1974) (“The ‘substance
over form’ argument is not a magic incantation which makes a transaction tax-exempt at a taxpayer’s command (or taxable at the Commissioner’s wish).”); Harris v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 770, 783
(1974) (“But a mere incantation of ‘substance versus form’ and ‘step transaction’ does not transform a transaction with one set of tax consequences into a transaction with different tax consequences.”); Yates Holding Corp. v. Comm’r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 303, 307 (1979) (“‘Substance over
form’ is not a talismanic incantation that will transform or recast an event. Rather, it is a doctrine
which depends upon the presentation of facts sufficient in quantity and quality to establish the ‘true
nature of a transaction’ and strip away the disguise of ‘mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter
tax liabilities.’”).
41. See, e.g., Isenbergh, supra note 9, at 870 (“Subsequent decisions have found in Gregory a
broad mandate to attack perceived ‘bad’ features of transactions, however firmly anchored within
the terms of the Code.”).
42. Upstream refers to the somewhat unnatural phenomenon of gifts given from a younger
person to an older one (e.g., parent or grandparent), in contrast to the usual practice of an older
person making gifts to a younger person (e.g., child or grandchild). See Jonathan Curry, TCJA
Supercharges ‘Upstream’ Estate Tax Planning Techniques, 158 TAX NOTES 1845, 1845 (2018)
(defining upstream).
43. I.R.C. § 2042 (2018).
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of the policy.44 This inclusion rule is important because, without it, it
would be possible to strip an estate of much of its value yet still maintain economic control over features that can readily function as a testamentary substitute.45
But for more than five decades, an important loophole to this life
insurance inclusion rule has existed.46 If a taxpayer establishes an irrevocable trust over which no control is retained and that either (i)
purchases a new life insurance policy on the taxpayer’s life or (ii) receives an existing life insurance policy,47 a taxpayer can keep the death
benefits from the policy out of her gross estate.48 In addition, the subsequent annual life insurance premiums can be paid by the taxpayer
without incurring any gift tax exposure because the so-called annual
exclusion (currently equal to $16,000 per donee) may shelter such
trust contributions from gift tax.49 This situation can extend for as long
as the taxpayer lives, enabling thousands, even millions of dollars of
trust contributions (plus the earnings that the insurance company will
credit over that period to the policy) to escape the gift tax base.50 Such
44. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (2020) (“For purposes of this paragraph, the term ‘incidents
of ownership’ is not limited in its meaning to ownership of the policy in the technical legal sense.
Generally speaking, the term has reference to the right of the insured or his estate to the economic
benefits of the policy. Thus, it includes the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel
the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain
from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policy, etc.”).
45. Absent this rule, taxpayers could diminish their estates by the amount of the premiums
paid plus earnings that those amounts might have generated, even though those values will continue
to be among the wealth transferred at death.
46. Beginning in 1918, under the prior rule, insurance “taken out by the decedent upon his
own life” and payable either to his estate or named beneficiaries was includable in the decedent’s
gross estate. Revenue Act of 1918, § 402(f), 40 Stat. 1057, 1098 (1918). However, Congress subsequently limited the application of this broad rule. See Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753,
§ 404(a), 56 Stat. 798, 944 (1942) (essentially limiting estate tax inclusion to those instances when
taxpayers retain any indicia of control).
47. In the latter case, if the policy being transferred already has cash surrender value, this
would ordinarily be regarded as a gift to the trust beneficiaries that would be subject to gift tax. See
I.R.C. § 2501 (2018). For reasons that are explained in the next two paragraphs, utilization of the
taxpayer’s annual exclusion found under I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2018) often shelters such trust contributions from any gift tax exposure.
48. See, e.g., Adam L. Abrahams, Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts: An Effective Estate Tax
Reduction Technique, PRAC. TAX LAW., Summer 2013, at 35, 36 (2013) (“An ILIT removes the
life insurance proceeds from the gross estate of a decedent, thus reducing one’s taxable estate.”).
49. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2018). Thus, a married taxpayer who has two daughters, two sonsin-law, and four grandchildren could make all of the foregoing family members trust beneficiaries.
In such a case, the married couple can “split” such gifts (I.R.C. § 2513 (2018)), enabling up to
$256,000 of contributed value annually to escape the gift tax base (i.e., for annual exclusion purposes, in the case of married couples, there is currently an effective $32,000 per beneficiary limit).
50. See David C. Johnson, Cumulation of Lifetime Gifts in the Federal Estate Tax Computation, 1984 S. ILL. U. L.J. 283, 287–88 (“This is because: the annual exclusion escapes both gift and
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trust contributions can produce a generously funded policy, which in
turn can yield a substantial death benefit that will escape the estate tax
base.51 And if a taxpayer’s so-called generation-skipping transfer tax
exemption is allocated to the annual trust contributions,52 the insurance proceeds can cascade down multiple generations and escape the
generation-skipping transfer tax base as well.
But to qualify for the annual exclusion (upon which this arrangement depends), the gifts in question must be of a “present interest.”53
Gifts in trust do not routinely so qualify for this exclusion; instead,
they ordinarily constitute future interests (i.e., they vest at a later point
in time).54 In the 1960s, in order to create a colorable present interest,
creative estate planners conceived of the following simple two-step
process: (i) with respect to any trust contribution, give designated beneficiaries the right to demand distributions of those amounts during a
limited period of time; (ii) if the trust beneficiaries fail to make such
demands within the allotted time frame, their invasion right will lapse,
leaving the contributed assets inside the trust, where they can be used
to pay insurance premiums.55
estate tax computations; the gift tax computation is based on the net amount transferred; the appreciation from the gifted property is removed; the payment of gift tax itself depletes the estate; and,
to the extent income is shifted, the income is removed from the estate tax base.” (footnotes omitted)).
51. See Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L.
REV. 1183, 1245 n.179 (1983) (“This decrease in progressivity occurs because the tax-free [annual
exclusion] gift removes from the tax base property that would be taxed at the highest applicable
marginal rate if retained.”).
52. See I.R.C. § 2631 (2018).
53. See id. § 2503(b) (“In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future interests in property)
. . . .”). Treasury Regulations define future present and present interest as follows:
“Future interest” is a legal term, and includes reversions, remainders, and other interests
or estates, whether vested or contingent, and whether or not supported by a particular
interest or estate, which are limited to commence in use, possession, or enjoyment at
some future date or time. . . .
An unrestricted right to the immediate use, possession, or enjoyment of property or
the income from property (such as a life estate or term certain) is a present interest in
property.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a)–(b) (as amended in 1983).
54. See, e.g., John G. Steinkamp, Common Sense and the Gift Tax Annual Exclusion, 72 NEB.
L. REV. 106, 123 (1993) (“Gifts in trust, however, do not necessarily result in allowance of the
annual exclusion. A gift in trust may result in the transfer of many equitable interests to many
beneficiaries. Because of the many ways in which gifts may be made in trust, no simple rule exists
for determining whether such a gift is of a present or future interest.” (footnotes omitted)).
55. See Robert B. Smith, Should We Give Away the Annual Exclusion?, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 361,
388 (1993).
As a means of satisfying the present interest requirement in connection with transfers in
trust, taxpayers’ advisors developed plans which gave the trust beneficiaries withdrawal
rights with respect to property transferred to the trust. The trust beneficiary or
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To illustrate, suppose A is married to B and they have four children, C, D, E, and F. Suppose further that A establishes an irrevocable
trust that buys a $5 million life insurance policy on his life with annual
premiums of $135,000, whose terms contain a 30-day withdrawal
power. Each year, A contributes the sum of $135,000 to the trust and
the trustee of the trust informs B that she has the right to make a trust
withdrawal of $15,000 and informs C, D, E, and F that they each have
the right to make a trust withdrawal of $30,000.56 After the 30-day
window lapses, and assuming that B, C, D, E, and F fail to exercise
their trust withdrawal rights, the trustee may use the contributed trust
funds to pay the life insurance premium that is due. Without utilizing
a dime of his lifetime exemption amount, A can continue to make annual trust contributions for years or decades to come until he passes
away, and the trust will receive the $5 million death benefit.
Although the technique is dubious, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in Crummey v. Commissioner57 endorsed the withdrawal technique as complying with the annual exclusion requirement,58 after which these invasion powers were eponymously dubbed
“Crummey withdrawal powers.”59 In practice, the grant of a Crummey
withdrawal power is illusory. Several factors lead to that conclusion:
If the holder of the power is a minor, the power would be exercised—
or, in actuality, not exercised—by the minor’s parent or guardian;60
the period during which the invasion option can be exercised may be

beneficiaries are granted a right, exercisable with respect to property transferred into the
trust and for a limited period of time following the transfer, such as 30 days, to withdraw
an amount equal to the lesser of: (i) a pro rata share of the property contributed to the
trust; or (ii) the annual exclusion. Such withdrawal rights give each beneficiary an unrestricted right, upon their demand, to use or enjoy the amount subject thereto.
Id.
56. With respect to the children, A and B can make so-called split gifts so that each may be
deemed to have made a gift of one-half each. See I.R.C. § 2513(a)(1) (2018).
57. 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
58. Id. at 88.
59. See Dora Arash, Comment, Crummey Trusts: An Exploitation of the Annual Exclusion, 21
PEPP. L. REV. 83, 92 (1993) (“To avoid the unfavorable tax consequences of such transfers, practitioners have developed an ingenious device that qualifies a transfer as a present interest while permitting the deferral of distribution to the intended beneficiary. The device employed by estate planners to avoid the adverse tax consequences of an inter vivos transfer is known as a Crummey
Trust.”).
60. An IRS Revenue Ruling and several private letter rulings support this position and indeed
go a step further: if there is no natural guardian to the minor but one could be court appointed, the
minor’s Crummey withdrawal right qualifies for the annual exclusion. See Rev. Rul. 73-405, 19732 C.B. 321; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8143045 (July 29, 1981); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8121069 (Feb. 26,
1981).
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quite brief;61 and it is even unclear whether the beneficiaries need to
be notified of the existence of their right of invasion.62
Thus, as a practical matter, it is exceedingly rare that Crummey
withdrawal powers are exercised.63 Yet, the barest possibility that they
might be is the concept that makes irrevocable insurance trusts useful
in estate planning.64 In early cases, including Crummey itself, the IRS
questioned the legitimacy of this planning device, for good reason:
while the form of the contribution technically met the specified Code
requirements of being a present interest, the substance of the transaction strongly suggested that the taxpayer’s true objective was to have
the trust funds vest years or decades later (an anathema for gift tax
annual exclusion qualification).65

61. For example, in Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74, 84 (1991), the Tax Court
held that the fifteen-day period involved in that case was sufficient.
62. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9030005 (Apr. 19, 1990) (ruling that a trustee need not send a
Crummey notice to himself); Est. of Turner v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 214, 229 (2011) (allowing indirect trust gifts (i.e., grantor’s direct payments of premiums on a trust-owned policy to
the carrier) to qualify for the annual exclusion, even though the trustee did not provide notice to the
trust beneficiaries of their withdrawal rights in these indirect gifts).
63. See generally Bradley E.S. Fogel, The Emperor Does Not Need Clothes—The Expanding
Use of “Naked” Crummey Withdrawal Powers to Obtain Federal Gift Tax Annual Exclusions, 73
TUL. L. REV. 555 (1998) (explaining why beneficiaries rarely, if ever, exercise their withdrawal
rights).
The concept of a so-called naked Crummey right is interesting in and of itself. Usually,
when a Crummey right lapses, the beneficiary retains a vested interest in the trust corpus (which,
as a product of such lapse, now grows larger). Id. at 559. But this need not be the case; in other
words, taxpayers may grant a Crummey right to a person who has no future interest in the trust
corpus. Id. at 570. As observed by one commentator, a naked Crummey right is “a lapsing demand
right without any corresponding interest in the corpus of the trust.” Patrick T. Neil, “Bare”ly Legal:
The Evolution of Naked Crummey Powers and a Call for Reform, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 923, 938
(2003). The same commentator added, “With naked Crummey powers, the beneficiary has no conceivable economic incentive to allow a lapse to occur because once the demand power has lapsed,
the income from that demand right is gone forever.” Id. In Estate of Cristofani, 97 T.C. 74 (1991),
for example, the Tax Court sanctioned the taxpayer’s use of semi-naked Crummey powers extending to the taxpayer’s grandchildren who only had a contingent interest in the trust, predicated upon
their parents predeceasing them. Id. at 83.
64. Fogel, supra note 63, at 617 (“There is, however, nothing unique to a naked Crummey
power [(i.e., a beneficiary who has only a remote trust interest)], in and of itself, that renders it
invalid. While the use of naked Crummey powers is, without question, artificial, all Crummey powers are artificial and the distinctions drawn between naked and other Crummey powers lack substance.”).
65. See Kristin L. Zook, Note, A Not-So-Crummey Way to Avoid Taxes: A Call for Congressional Action to Eliminate Abuse of the Present Interest Requirement, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 583,
585–86 (2008) (“Further, those who do not qualify without Crummey’s expanded interpretation,
but nonetheless are granted exclusions under the Crummey rationale, are in effect abusing the benefit and becoming entitled to exclusions that they would otherwise be denied. This abuse by
Crummey powers is not parallel with Congress’ original intention behind the enactment of the federal gift tax and the annual exclusion.”).
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After several years of judiciary pushback, which never seriously
entertained the application of the substance over form doctrine in this
context, the IRS has acquiesced to this outcome.66 While it seems that
the agency would be free to reconsider its position, it is more likely
that congressional action would now be required to close this loophole.67
B. Family Limited Partnerships
In a family limited partnership situation, a commonplace scenario
is as follows: a wealthy taxpayer establishes a limited partnership;
contributes property to this enterprise; and then distributes partnership
interests to her family members, in varying proportions according to
the taxpayer’s preferences.68
This simple arrangement can produce significant transfer tax savings. Because the partnership interests in question are not traded on a
public market, a valuation discount is available for their lack of marketability; furthermore, because the interests accorded to family members are strategically made below 50 percent, their status permits minority discounts.69 The combination of marketability and minority
66. See Crummey v. Comm’r, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 772 (1966), action on dec., 1966-144
(Aug. 23, 1966) (“Further litigation of this issue is unwarranted. The Service accepts the view that
gifts in trusts for minors under circumstances similar to the instant case should not be classified as
future interests merely because no guardian was in fact appointed as long as the trust provides for
such appointment and no legal impediment under local law exists.”).
67. Due to the natural limitations related to the size of the annual exclusion, this device has
primarily been used by medium-sized estates, in the $5 million to $25 million range. However,
given the size of the current lifetime exemption ($12,060,000), estates of this size are now largely
beyond the reach of the current transfer tax system. Rev. Proc. 2021-45, § 3.41, 2021-48 I.R.B.
764, 771. As a result, this device holds less appeal to estate planners unless or until the lifetime
exclusion is decreased to levels more in keeping with the historical purpose of transfer taxes. See
Jay A. Soled, The Federal Estate Tax Exemption and the Need for Its Reduction, 47 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 649 (2020) (observing that the lifetime exemption is too high and, as such, subverting the
historic purposes of the nation’s transfer tax regime).
68. See, e.g., Troy Renkemeyer, Comment, The Family Limited Partnership: An Effective Estate Planning Tool, 64 UMKC L. REV. 587, 587–92 (1996) (extolling the virtues of family limited
partnerships as a device to minimize transfer tax exposure).
69. See Ronald H. Jensen, The Magic of Disappearing Wealth Revisited: Using Family Limited Partnerships to Reduce Estate and Gift Tax, 1 PITT. TAX REV. 155, 155 (2004) (“Medieval
alchemists strived to transmute base metals into gold. Today, taxpayers seek a reverse transmutation: to reduce the value of their property—at least when it is being valued for gift and estate tax
purposes.”); D. John Thornton & Gregory A. Byron, Valuation of Family Limited Partnership Interests, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 345, 361–71 (1996) (explaining how taxpayers can camouflage the fair
market value of the partnership interests that they transfer); Mary Louise Fellows & William H.
Painter, Valuing Close Corporations for Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes: A Statutory Solution to
the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30 STAN. L. REV. 895, 903–21 (1978) (describing marketability and minority discounts).
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interest discounts, combined with the use of the gift tax annual exclusion, can shield large partnership interest transfers from gift tax exposure.70 Indeed, common valuation discounts can range from 10 percent
to 70 percent and remain available even when the contributed partnership assets consist mostly of securities that are themselves readily marketable.71
To illustrate, assume that a taxpayer establishes a family limited
partnership with her husband and that together they contribute a jointly
owned building worth $1 million. Assume further that a week later
they each give their daughter a 24 percent partnership interest. For gift
tax purposes, rather than the transferred partnership interest being valued at $240,000 (i.e., 24% x $1 million), the taxpayers could conservatively take a combined 40 percent minority and marketability valuation discount and instead report making a taxable gift of $144,000
(i.e., 24% x $1 million x (1 - 0.4)).
Of course, to believe that contributing assets to a family limited
partnership and then transferring such partnership interests inherently
reduces the fair market value of the contributed assets is silly on its
face. No rational taxpayer would vandalize her own assets in a manner
that purposely diminishes their value.72 Instead, the taxpayers are using a form—namely, a family limited partnership—to camouflage the
substance of what they are seeking to achieve, which is to enrich
younger family members with minimal transfer tax exposure. Once
the family limited partnership is in place, family members can easily
cooperate to maximize the value that each would receive were the partnership assets or its interests sold or liquidated. The asset value, in
other words, isn’t truly destroyed; it is merely temporarily marred,

70. See, e.g., Thomas E. Rutledge & Lady E. Booth, The Limited Liability Company Act: Understanding Kentucky’s New Organizational Option, 83 KY. L.J. 1, 116 (1995) (“If the LLC has
continuity of life, then annual exclusion gifts may be facilitated, and reduction in value may result
from the lack of marketability and minority interest discounts.”).
71. See, e.g., Est. of Kelley v. Comm’r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 369, 371, 374 (2005) (according
significant discounts for the interests that the taxpayers transferred in a case involving a family
limited partnership the assets of which consisted solely of cash and certificates of deposit); see also
Wendy C. Gerzog, Valuation Discounting Techniques: Terms Gone Awry, 61 TAX LAW. 775, 789–
91 (2008) (citing range of discounts and describing a litany of cases involving this commonplace
phenomenon).
72. See Samuel A. Donaldson, Super-Recognition and the Return-to-Sender Exception: The
Federal Income Tax Problems of Liquidating the Family Limited Partnership, 35 CAP. U. L. REV.
15, 15–16 (2006) (“The Internal Revenue Service (Service) sees the family limited partnership as
an elaborate shell game designed to artificially destroy value and, thus, unfairly reduce the federal
gift tax or federal estate tax liability associated with wealth transfers.”).
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subject to later cleanup and restoration when it is convenient from a
tax viewpoint.73
A quick review of the dynamics of family limited partnerships
reveals their true essence. They are nothing more than devices to diminish value on a temporary basis.74 Putting aside the vicissitudes of
business and economic cycles, it would seem that virtually no one has
ever lost a dollar by entering into these arrangements. Yes, misguided
family members could turn against one another; but the far more likely
scenario is that, consistent with their collective financial self-interest,
they will all work together to maximize value.75
Family limited partnerships would thus seem fertile grounds for
the IRS to invoke the substance over form doctrine, and one might
think that courts would be receptive to the agency’s efforts to do so.
But after some important initial failures to persuade the courts,76 the
IRS has largely abandoned its effort to draw the line at the point where
no discounts would be allowed,77 settling instead for occasional
73. See Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value-Lines, 43
TAX L. REV. 241, 254 n.54 (1988) (“Of course, in many of these cases, the economic loss attributable to the creation of minority interests is probably illusory, or else the transaction would not have
been undertaken in the first place.”).
74. See Joseph M. Dodge, Three Whacks at Wealth Transfer Tax Reform: Retained-Interest
Transfers, Generation-Skipping Trusts, and FLP Valuation Discounts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 999, 1029
(2016) (“Three facts offer strong circumstantial evidence that FLPs (and similarly constituted entities) are primarily motivated to save transfer taxes. First, the claimed purpose of destroying family
wealth, if correct, is irrational. Second, FLPs were not discernable in the commercial landscape
until their gift/estate tax benefits were publicized. Third, FLPs are exclusively used by wealthy
individuals facing estate tax exposure.” (footnote omitted)).
75. See Laura E. Cunningham, Remember the Alamo: The IRS Needs Ammunition in Its Fight
Against the FLP, 86 TAX NOTES 1461, 1466 (2000) (discussing that a family attribution approach
has been attempted to eliminate the problem of disappearing value from minority interest discounting under the “theory . . . that minority discounts lack economic reality . . . because the family is
more likely than not to cooperate”). Furthermore, at the time of partnership formation, familial
relationships presumably were amicable or the taxpayer might not have seen the family limited
partnership as a promising estate tax–avoidance vehicle.
76. Key valuation adjudication cases in which courts ruled against the IRS and permitted steep
valuation discounts include the following: Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir.
1981); Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982); Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938 (1982); and Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 860 (1978).
77. See Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202, 1993 WL 15534, where the IRS has held thus:
If a donor transfers shares in a corporation to each of the donor’s children, the factor of
corporate control in the family is not considered in valuing each transferred interest for
purposes of section 2512 of the Code. For estate and gift tax valuation purposes, the
Service will follow Bright, Propstra, Andrews, and Lee in not assuming that all voting
power held by family members may be aggregated for purposes of determining whether
the transferred shares should be valued as part of a controlling interest. Consequently, a
minority discount will not be disallowed solely because a transferred interest, when aggregated with interests held by family members, would be a part of a controlling interest.
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challenges to family partnership arrangements on the basis that particular discounts are excessive78 or that the transfers themselves are ineffective.79
C. Upstream Transfers
Both Crummey withdrawal powers and family limited partnerships have been around for several decades. One might even say that
they are now scourges that have been inked into the estate planners’
playbook. But there is a new technique coming into vogue that is just
as egregious, commonly known as “upstream gifting” (a.k.a. “upstream transfers”).80 The technique involves the process of making
transfers from a younger generation to members of an older one—generally those who have relatively short remaining life expectancies.81
The surge of interest in such transfers can be traced to the Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017,82 which doubled the basic exclusion
amount from $5 million to $10 million.83 The size of the current exemption effectively eliminates many taxpayers’ transfer tax exposure.
As such, taxpayers are now at liberty to transfer during life and upon
This would be the case whether the donor held 100 percent or some lesser percentage of
the stock immediately before the gift.
Id. at *2.
78. See Alden Koste, Note, The IRS Fished Its Wish: The Ability of Section 2703 to Minimize
Valuation Discounts Afforded to Family Limited Partnership Interests in Holman v. Commissioner,
59 CATH. U. L. REV. 289, 294–305 (2009) (discussing cases in which the IRS has taken the position
that the valuation discount was excessive).
79. See, e.g., Est. of Abraham v. Comm’r, 408 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that money
in family limited partnerships established by the children of elderly taxpayer with Alzheimer’s disease was, due to taxpayer’s retained interest, includable in her gross estate); Est. of Erickson v.
Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1175, 1182 (2007) (ruling that transfer of property shortly before decedent died indicated that she had a retained interest in the property); Est. of Rosen v. Comm’r, 91
T.C.M. (CCH) 1220, 1232 (2006) (same).
80. This Article refers to “upstream gifts” as “upstream transfers” because the authors don’t
perceive such gifts as true gifts; however, the vernacular of the trade is to call them gifts. See, e.g.,
Curry, supra note 42, passim; Karen Hube, An Old Tax Dodge for the Wealthy Is Making a Comeback, BARRON’S (May 7, 2019), https://www.barrons.com/articles/upstream-planning-tax-dodge51556918447 [https://perma.cc/B96K-8HJR]; Lester B. Law & Howard M. Zaritsky, Basis After
the 2017 Tax Act—Important Before, Crucial Now, HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. 110 passim
(2019).
81. As a scientist might note, these are transactions that are not observed in nature. And they
are indeed often most unnatural: what could be the point of making a gift of property having a six, seven-, or eight-figure value to an elderly relative who is largely or entirely confined to a nursing
home?
82. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11061, 131 Stat. 2054, 2091 (2017).
83. These are the statutory exclusion amounts, but they are adjusted for inflation annually.
I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3)(B) (2018). For decedents dying in 2022, or gifts made in that year, the exclusion
is $12,060,000. Rev. Proc. 2021-45, § 3.41, 2021-48 I.R.B. 764, 771. In the case of a married couple, this can be effectively doubled to $24,120,000. I.R.C. § 2010(c)(4) (2018).
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death all or most of their estates absent the friction of transfer tax liability. In light of this new transfer tax landscape, creative tax planners
have significantly expanded the use of “upstream planning”—a
scheme that conforms to the Code’s literal dictates yet is substantively
vacant. But if history is any barometer, it is unlikely to be successfully
challenged by the IRS.
A simple example that captures the essence of upstream planning
follows. Suppose a wealthy taxpayer who owns title to a highly appreciated asset (perhaps a building with a zero tax basis but a fair market
value of $10 million) transfers title to the building to his 90-year-old
widowed mother, who has a $1 million net worth. Son expects, and
Mother understands, that upon her demise she will give the building
back to Son.84 Why would a wealthy taxpayer ever make such a transfer? Because when the son inherits the property from his mother, the
application of Code section 1014 will accord a tax basis in the building
equal to its fair market value at the date of his mother’s death.85 The
augmented tax basis would produce significant future income tax savings in the form of robust depreciation deductions or, upon the disposition of the building, smaller gains or larger losses than he would have
incurred had the proverbial angel of Code section 1014 not passed over
them.
This scheme is not entirely free of risk. Mother might fall in love
with the next Don Juan who checks into her nursing home, she might
discover religion and seek to leave the entirety of her assets to a local
church, another relative could fall ill and seem to Mother a more deserving heir, or Mother and Son could simply have a falling out. Furthermore, if Mother perishes within one year of the initial title transfer,
the basis-equal-to-fair-market-value rule will not apply.86 (This last
scenario isn’t much of a risk, however, as it leaves Son no worse off
than if he hadn’t made the transfer to Mother at all.)87
84. For heuristic reasons and to keep the illustration simple, Mother gave title to the building
directly back to Son outright. However, for transfer tax purposes, this outcome does not make sense
(i.e., it unnecessarily augments the size of the son’s gross estate), and most estate planners have
developed sophisticated planning techniques to minimize this concern. See infra note 87.
85. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2018).
86. Id. § 1014(e).
87. But it means that some transaction costs will have been incurred to no useful end. In addition, having utilized $10 million of his lifetime exemption by making the initial transfer, Son may
expose himself to future transfer tax consequences unnecessarily. The risk spectrum is serious
enough that a more elaborate upstream planning strategy has emerged. Instead of a simple outright
transfer to Mother, Son may establish an irrevocable trust for her benefit, the salient terms of which
would include a testamentary general power of appointment. Son would then contribute title to the
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Upstream planning of the sort described is financially attractive
to Son and harmless to Mother. Indeed, only the government suffers
by collecting less in both income and transfer taxes.88 One could imagine that the IRS would claim that these transactional charades
should be accorded no respect because they are not, in substance, gifts
at all. After all, upstream transfers have virtually none of the usual
characteristics of a traditional gift. On several occasions, the Supreme
Court has spoken about those characteristics. In Commissioner v.
LoBue,89 the Court observed that a gift proceeds from a “detached and
disinterested generosity.”90 In Commissioner v. Duberstein,91 the
Court declared that the character of the transaction should be determined by “the dominant reason that explains [the transferor’s] action
in making the transfer.”92 And in Bogardus v. Commissioner,93 the
Court added that a transfer would not be a gift if the transfer stems
from “the incentive of [future] anticipated benefit[s to the transferor].”94

building to the trust, rather than making an outright gift to Mother. If, as expected, Mother does not
exercise the general power of appointment—the mere presence of which causes the desired estate
tax inclusion (I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (2018))—then title to the building would flow in further trust for
the benefit of Son’s children/grandchildren. (Mother may allocate her generation-skipping transfer
exemption to the trust (I.R.C. § 2631(a) (2018)) to safeguard its proceeds from generation-skipping
transfer tax exposure.) Finally, Son may appoint a friendly party such as his spouse as the trustee.
If Son follows the foregoing steps (and Mother willingly acquiesces), he greatly diminishes the risk
that the building will slip out of his family’s control; furthermore, he eliminates future estate tax
inclusion of such property in his own estate.
88. The reason that the government loses income tax revenue is rather obvious from the application of the stepped-up basis rule. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2018).
The reason the government loses transfer tax revenue is somewhat less obvious. To illustrate this point, consider the following example and assume that the estate tax exemption and generation-skipping transfer tax exemption are each $10 million. Suppose Son, whose net worth is $30
million, transfers $10 million of appreciated assets to his Mother (who, prior to such transfer, was
penniless). Suppose further that two years later, Son’s Mother dies, establishing a lifetime trust for
the benefit of her son’s children (namely, her grandchildren), which ultimately vests with her greatgrandchildren and which, by the allocation of her generation-skipping transfer tax exemption,
would be protected from any future estate tax. By making this transfer to his Mother, Son is thus
able to exploit the use of her generation-skipping transfer tax exemption. Indeed, had the Son not
engaged in this upstream transfer, the total amount the Son would have been able to pass tax-free
to his grandchildren, namely, his Mother’s great-grandchildren, would have been $10 million; going through the upstream exercise enables the amount passing transfer tax-free to double to $20
million.
89. 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
90. Id. at 246.
91. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
92. Id. at 286.
93. 302 U.S. 34 (1937).
94. Id. at 41.
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None of these descriptions support characterizing upstream transfers as gifts. Such transfers are made with the expectation of a future
financial benefit inuring to the initial transferor, not the recipient of
such property; they do not proceed from detached and disinterested
generosity; and, without doubt, the dominant motivation underlying
such transfers is to reduce the transferor’s taxes rather than to enrich
the recipient.
Estate planners will be quick to point out that the three Supreme
Court decisions cited above are all income tax cases and that there is
a general interpretive principle that such cases are not regarded as in
pari materia with estate and gift tax cases.95 This is entirely sensible,
and nowhere more so than in defining what constitutes a gift:
(i)
due to their exclusion under Code section 102, for income
tax purposes, gifts are effectively removed from the tax
base, and, accordingly, a narrow understanding of the
word gift is essential to protect the fisc;96
(ii)
but for gift tax purposes, gifts are the tax base,97 and therefore it follows that the gift concept should be construed
much more expansively.98
However, notwithstanding the supposed breadth of the word
99
gift, there is a commonsense notion of what it means. And there
would likely be unanimity that it does not mean a pseudo transfer that
moves bare legal title temporarily (with 366 days being the ideal duration), following which the “gift” reverts back either directly to the
transferor or to his designees. That is the animating idea of upstream
transfers, and it doesn’t square well with anyone’s concept of a gift.
The central idea of a gift, for either income or gift tax purposes, is a

95. Cummings v. Comm’r, 506 F.2d 449, 454 (2d Cir. 1974); Early v. Comm’r, 445 F.2d 166,
172 (5th Cir. 1971); McGinnis v. Comm’r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1870, 1873 (1993); Towe v. Comm’r,
64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1424, 1426 (1992). Several commentators disagree and think that the income
and transfer tax systems should be read in pari materia. Mark J. Wolff, Dickman Confined: The
Taxation of Gratuitous Transfers of Use, 21 STETSON L. REV. 509, 512 (1992); see Erwin N. Griswold, A Plan for the Coordination of the Income, Estate, and Gift Tax Provisions with Respect to
Trusts and Other Transfers, 56 HARV. L. REV. 337 (1942).
96. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation
of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1992).
97. I.R.C. § 2502(a) (2018).
98. Id. § 2511(a).
99. Id.; see id. § 2501(a) (“A tax, computed as provided in section 2502, is hereby imposed
for each calendar year on the transfer of property by gift during such calendar year by any individual
resident or nonresident.”).
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voluntary transfer from a donor for the benefit of the donee.100 If the
obvious intent of the transfer is to create a direct or indirect benefit for
the donor, the transfer simply doesn’t comport with the notion of a
gift.
Furthermore, it is important to note that although this at first may
seem like a gift tax question because there may be an obligation to file
a gift tax return,101 it really isn’t. An important premise of the upstream
transfer model is that, notwithstanding an obligation to file a gift tax
return, there is no meaningful risk that there will be any transfer tax
liability associated with such transfers: the transferor and the recipient
will each be confident that the lifetime exclusion amount will shield
their respective transfers from any transfer tax exposure.102
So, in the end, the upstream transfer story is really anchored in
the income tax. The goal is to use—abuse is perhaps a better word—
the stepped-up basis rule of Code section 1014. If and when transactions of the sort described are challenged, it will be the IRS asserting
that, on the basis of substance over form, the transferred asset’s basis
should remain the same as it was in the hands of the transferor.
Whether the judiciary will embrace the IRS entreaties to accept the
doctrine’s application remains to be seen.
***
The three foregoing transfer tax–saving devices are simply representative. Estate planners have a large repertoire of additional techniques at their disposal to minimize taxpayers’ transfer tax burdens.103
And try as the IRS might to employ the substance over form doctrine
to defeat taxpayer shenanigans, courts have mostly blocked the
agency’s efforts to do so.104

100. See generally Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and
Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1978) (explaining the role of gifts in the context of
the income and transfer tax systems).
101. I.R.C. § 6019 (2018).
102. Id. § 2010(c).
103. See generally Edward M. Manigault & Milford B. Hatcher Jr., GRATS and GST Planning—Potential Pitfall and Possible Planning Opportunity, 20 PROB. & PROP. 28 (2006) (describing the estate planning benefits associated with the use of grantor-retained annuity trusts).
104. See, e.g., Knight v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 506, 514–15 (2000) (refusing the IRS’s invitation
to apply the substance over form doctrine to unwind taxpayer’s transaction).
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IV. THE JUDICIARY AND ITS RELUCTANCE TO EMPLOY THE
SUBSTANCE OVER FORM DOCTRINE
To be clear, it would be inaccurate to claim that judges never employ the substance over form doctrine in the transfer tax realm. Judges
do use the substance over form doctrine, although such use is exceedingly rare. In Section A, this analysis examines those situations when
the judiciary occasionally relies upon the substance over form doctrine
even in this realm; in Section B, this analysis offers possible reasons
why this phenomenon is such a rarity.
A. The Substance over Form Doctrine: Limited Utilization in the
Transfer Tax Realm
When it comes to transfer tax adjudication, in a few limited situations involving instances of obvious abuse, the IRS has successfully
invoked the substance over form doctrine. Consider three examples of
its application.
One example involves reciprocal transfers. In a wonderfully
named case, United States v. Estate of Grace,105 the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the substance over form doctrine has a role to play
in the transfer tax arena.106 In this case, the taxpayer and his wife
sought to ensure mutual financial protection while simultaneously
seeking to minimize their estate tax exposure. To accomplish these
dual objectives, the husband and wife prepared reciprocal trusts for
each other’s benefit whereby neither would be bereft of assets (i.e., the
husband contributed assets into trust for his wife’s benefit, and, conversely, his wife contributed assets into trust for her husband’s benefit).107 Had each spouse independently established a trust for his/her
own benefit and retained an interest therein, the creation of such trusts
would have resulted in estate tax being imposed upon each grantor’s
gross estate.108 By going through the reciprocal trust exercise, however, the married couple sought to circumvent this explicit congressional directive. Had they been successful, they would have blazed a
gaping hole in the estate tax base. On this exceptional occasion,
though, the judiciary decided to buck its traditional willingness in the
transfer tax realm to respect the form of a transaction even when its
105.
106.
107.
108.

395 U.S. 316 (1969).
Id. at 323 (citing Est. of Spiegel v. Comm’r, 335 U.S. 701, 705–06 (1949)).
Id. at 318–19.
I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2018).
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substance is quite different. Instead, it deemed this arrangement to be
wholly ineffective in removing assets from the respective spouses’
transfer tax bases.109 In cases involving virtually identical fact patterns, several other courts have followed the Supreme Court’s lead in
Estate of Grace.110
Another transfer tax situation in which courts have demonstrated
a willingness to invoke the substance over form doctrine is when taxpayers seek to orchestrate their affairs to avoid possible gift tax inclusion in their gross estates. In Estate of Sachs v. Commissioner,111 for
example, less than three years before his death in 1980, Samuel Sachs
and his wife gifted stock worth approximately $2.3 million to irrevocable trusts established for the benefit of their grandchildren.112 The
donation was designed as a net gift, i.e., the trust instrument required
that as a condition of the gift the donee trustees satisfy all gift tax liability arising from the Sachses’ stock contribution, and, in 1978, they
fulfilled this obligation.113 When Mr. Sachs died in 1980, the IRS
sought to include the amount of the gift tax paid in his gross estate
under Code section 2035(c), which then stated that “[t]he amount of
the gross estate . . . shall be increased by the amount of any tax
paid . . . by the decedent or his estate on any gift made by the decedent
or his spouse . . . during the 3-year period ending on the date of the
109. See Est. of Grace, 395 U.S. at 320. “The doctrine of reciprocal trusts was formulated in
response to attempts to draft instruments which seemingly avoid the literal terms of § [2036(a)],
while still leaving the decedent the lifetime enjoyment of his property.” Id.
110. An interesting variant of the reciprocal gift situation is one in which multiple gifts are
made to members of a junior generation by members of a senior generation in an effort to make the
maximum use of the annual exclusion. A case that presented this situation in a rather perfect form
was Sather v. Commissioner, 251 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 2001). In Sather there were three brothers,
each of whom conveniently had three children. Id. at 1170. The brothers decided that each would
give an annual gift in an amount equal to approximately the maximum annual exclusion at the time
($10,000) to each of his own children, and similar gifts to each niece and nephew. Id. Their spouses
did the same. Id. The result was that each child received gifts totaling $60,000, instead of the
$20,000 that they would have been limited to had they gotten gifts from only their own parents. Id.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, ruled that only $20,000 qualified for
the annual exclusion because the substance of the transaction was to make large gifts to each taxpayer’s own child rather than smaller gifts to each son, daughter, niece, and nephew. Id. at 1175;
see also Schultz v. United States, 493 F.2d 1225, 1225–26 (4th Cir. 1974) (ruling that gifts made
by two brothers were reciprocal where they each gifted stock in a closely held corporation to their
own three children and their sibling’s three children); Exch. Bank & Tr. Co. of Fla. v. United States,
694 F.2d 1261, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (applying reciprocal trust doctrine where each parent relinquished control over the same number of shares that each gained as a custodian for the benefit of
their minor children).
111. 856 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1988).
112. Id. at 1159.
113. Id.
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decedent’s death.”114 The estate countered by declaring that the donee
trustees had paid the gift tax, thereby negating its inclusion in the decedent’s gross estate.115 In rendering its decision in the IRS’s favor,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that “[w]here
taxpayers have structured indirect transactions to obtain tax advantages, the law typically looks to the substance, and not the form of
the transaction.”116 Here, the payment of the gift tax, though paid by
the donee trustees, was tantamount to being paid by the donor and thus
includable in his gross estate. Other cases involving similar fact patterns involving net gifts have yielded the same outcomes.117
A final situation in which courts have demonstrated a willingness
to ignore the form of a transaction and focus instead on its substance
is when transfers have amounted to fraud. An emblematic case is Estate of Cidulka v. Commissioner.118 In Cidulka, to exploit the gift tax
annual exclusion, a donor transferred stock to his son, daughter-inlaw, and grandchildren.119 However, when the daughter-in-law received the gifted shares, she immediately transferred them to her husband (i.e., the transferor’s son);120 furthermore, the grandchildren
never secured any of the benefits associated with corporate stock ownership insofar as when the corporate assets were sold, they failed to
receive their pro rata share of the proceeds.121 In this case and similar
ones, the courts have held that the substance over form doctrine applies and have ruled in the IRS’s favor.122
The foregoing situations each involved transparent attempted
work-arounds of well-established Code provisions. In each of these
situations, the IRS was willing to employ the substance over form doctrine to combat these ploys, with the ultimate endorsement of the
courts. The courts’ willingness to venture beyond pure textualism is
likely reflective of their perceived role as protectors of the Code,
114. I.R.C. § 2035(c) (1988) (current version at I.R.C. § 2035(b) (2018)).
115. Estate of Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1163.
116. Id. at 1164.
117. See, e.g., Est. of Morgens v. Comm’r, 678 F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that gift
taxes paid by gift recipients were includable in the decedent’s gross estate); Brown v. United States,
329 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that even though in form the wife paid the gift tax
liability on the husband’s gift, in substance it was the husband’s funds that paid the gift tax).
118. 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2555 (1996).
119. Id. at 2556–57.
120. Id. at 2556.
121. Id. at 2557.
122. Id. at 2565–66; see, e.g., Heyen v. United States, 945 F.2d 359, 365 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that use of intermediaries to capitalize upon the annual exclusion was ineffectual); Est. of Bies
v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 628, 631–32 (2000) (same).
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safeguarding it from those taxpayers who seek to trample upon its fundamental tenets. Furthermore, beyond institutional preservation of the
transfer tax base, judges also try to protect their personal reputations
and, even in the transfer tax realm, do not wish the public to perceive
them as unwitting abettors to taxpayers’ tax abuse.123
B. The Substance over Form Doctrine: The Puzzle of Judicial
Acquiescence
In more complex transfer tax planning situations, however, such
as the three types of transactions described in Part III as well as other
transactions,124 the courts have greeted IRS challenges that rely upon
the substance over form doctrine with far more skepticism. The question is why. This section offers our speculations about the reasons for
the judiciary’s hands-off approach with regard to transfer tax situations and the substance over form doctrine and then outlines the concomitant consequences.
One imaginable reason that judges are more deferential to taxpayers in the transfer tax context may be that the deeds under analysis are
acts of giving—which might at first blush seem like manifestations of
altruism. More specifically, when taxpayers make gratuitous transfers
and seek to minimize their transfer tax exposure, their actions may
superficially appear to be laudable measures to financially protect
their loved ones. Yet, upon deeper reflection, this sort of reverent attitude appears unwarranted. After all, taxpayers cannot take their
worldly possessions with them into whatever comes next, so it follows
that those assets must ultimately pass to someone. Thus, in the
life/death context, giving to a family member, a close relative, or a
friend does not reflect altruism or selflessness; it is virtually the opposite. Therefore, taxpayers deserve no special concessions on grounds
of their supposed unselfishness.
Another possible explanation for the judiciary’s hesitancy to embrace the substance over form doctrine is the fact that transfer taxes
are particularly disliked—at least by those who will be, or think that
they might be, subject to them.125 As a group, targets of the estate
123. See, e.g., Ashley Deeks, Secrecy Surrogates, 106 VA. L. REV. 1395, 1416 (2020)
(“[J]udges seek to preserve their reputation among their peers and the public.”).
124. See cases cited supra Part III; see, e.g., Dodge, supra note 74 (explaining other transfer
tax strategies and the need for legislative reform).
125. This animus is nicely detailed in chapter 6 of a book authored by David Cay Johnston.
DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM
TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH—AND CHEAT EVERYONE ELSE 71–91 (2003); see also Richard L.
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tax—society’s most financially prosperous citizens126—often believe
that their wealth has already endured a gauntlet of tax burdens and
should not be subject to yet another one.127 And there is an abundance
of evidence that judges are largely selected from among those who are
economically well-to-do.128 It is easy to imagine that their socioeconomic status may incline them to harbor a negative view toward
wealth transfer taxes.
A final factor that could play a part in the gentle judicial oversight
of the nation’s transfer tax system is that these taxes have long been
viewed as having the airy quality of Swiss cheese. Testifying before
the Ways and Means Committee, Harvard Law School Professor A.
James Casner once declared, “[W]e haven’t got an estate tax[;] what
we have, you pay an estate tax if you want to; if you don’t want to,
you don’t have to.”129 A few years later, George Cooper, a Columbia
law professor, elaborated upon Casner’s characterization, affirming its
central tenets.130 Because the wealth transfer taxes have comprehensive deductions for gifts and bequests made to charities or a surviving
spouse,131 there is technical truth in the claims of Professors Casner
and Cooper. However, if a testator’s desire is (as is usually the case)
Schmalbeck, Class War and the Estate Tax: Have the Troops Gone AWOL?, in LAW AND CLASS
IN AMERICA: TRENDS SINCE THE COLD WAR 191 (Paul D. Carrington & Trina Jones eds., 2006)
(exploring the reasons why the American public appears to support repeal of the estate tax).
126. The estate tax currently (in 2022) exempts $12,060,000 from tax. I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2018).
This large dollar figure protects the vast majority of taxpayers from transfer tax exposure. Indeed,
by way of example, in 2018 (when the estate tax exemption was $11,180,000), only a mere 2,000
or so of the nation’s wealthiest estates were subject to the estate tax. See How Many People Pay
the Estate Tax?, TAX POL’Y CTR. (2021), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/howmany-people-pay-estate-tax [https://perma.cc/2VQX-GER8] (estimating 1,900 taxable estates in
2018).
127. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Death Tax? Double Tax? For Most, It’s No Tax, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/14/business/yourmoney/death-taxdouble-tax-for-most-its-no-tax.html [https://perma.cc/W56Q-PSCP] (“And while opponents contend that the estate tax is a ‘double tax,’ . . . .”).
128. See, e.g., Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 137 (2013) (explaining how, due to their wealth and socioeconomic position, judges harbor
implicit biases).
129. Federal Estate and Gift Taxes: Hearing Before the H. Ways & Means Comm., 94th Cong.
1335 (1976). Others have made similar claims. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Kinsler, A Comparative Proposal to Reform the United States Gift Tax Annual Exclusion, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 949,
952 (1997) (“United States citizens are not required to pay estate and gift taxes! In fact, the only
people who should pay such taxes are those wishing to donate money to the U.S. government.”);
Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145,
1215 (1992) (remarking that “the system is so racked with exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions
that hardly anyone actually pays any wealth transfer tax”).
130. George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 164 (1977).
131. I.R.C. §§ 2055(a), 2056(a) (2018).
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to pass substantial wealth to succeeding family generations, then the
Casner/Cooper characterizations border on hyperbole.132 Yet, regardless of their truth, the widespread notion that these taxes are easily
avoided has contributed to a sense that Congress has been complicit in
creating—and failing to reform—a wealth transfer tax system that is
more or less intentionally leaky. In other words, many commentators
claim that Congress must have meant for the courts to interpret the
Code in a manner that is generous to donors and their estates. That
being the case, why would a court wish to thwart the legislature’s apparent intent?
The main consequence associated with the judiciary’s reluctance
to employ the substance over form doctrine boils down to a severe loss
of transfer tax revenue. Although the IRS projects that the tax gap—
the difference between what taxpayers actually pay in taxes in a timely
manner and what they should pay if they fully comply with the tax
laws133—associated with the estate tax is currently $1 billion annually,134 this dollar figure only captures truly abusive arrangements
and/or the failure to report otherwise taxable transfers. However, it
does not capture so-called plain-vanilla arrangements (such as the
three highlighted in Part III of this analysis) that the courts have sanctioned. Due to the popularity of these transfer tax strategies, it is easy
to imagine with billions of dollars of wealth being transferred annually
that a lot of potential tax revenue is inappropriately avoiding collection
inappropriately.135
In addition to the obvious revenue loss, the judiciary’s laissezfaire approach toward statutory interpretation tends toward the very
132. See Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, The Estate Tax Non-Gap: Why Repeal a “Voluntary” Tax?, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 154 (2009) (pointing out that the nation’s transfer tax
system is not easily avoided, which is why the wealthy have heavily lobbied to have Congress
repeal it); see also Richard Schmalbeck, Avoiding Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, in RETHINKING
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 113, 145–46 (William G. Gale, James R. Hines Jr. & Joel Slemrod
eds., 2001).
133. Robert E. Brown & Mark J. Mazur, IRS’s Comprehensive Approach to Compliance Measurement, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 689, 689 (2003) (defining the tax gap); Mark J. Mazur & Alan H. Plumley, Understanding the Tax Gap, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 569, 569 (2007) (same).
134. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP
ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013 (2019), at 3, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1415.pdf
[https://perma.cc/372J-9G7M].
135. See, e.g., Matthew Heimer, How Billionaires Beat the Estate Tax, MARKETWATCH
(Dec. 20, 2013, 1:36 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-billionaires-beat-the-estatetax-1387564611 [https://perma.cc/4RA8-X2EV] (relying upon another transfer tax-avoidance
strategy known as grantor-retained annuity trusts (GRAT), “Sheldon and Miriam Adelson have
used GRATs to pass $7.9 billion worth of wealth to their children since 2010—most of it in the
form of stock in Las Vegas Sands Corp., which Sheldon Adelson founded in 1988.”).
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result that Professors Casner and Cooper imagined—a wealth transfer
tax system that is a mockery. Taxpayers who participate in various tax
machinations—such as Crummey trusts, family limited partnerships,
and upstream planning—likely smirk as they are able to save thousands, millions, or, in some cases, billions in transfer tax dollars.136
But it doesn’t have to be this way.
V. TWO POSSIBLE PATHS TO REFORM
There is no magic wand that one can wave to make the judiciary
more willing to use the substance over form doctrine in rendering its
transfer tax adjudications. However, there are certain steps that Congress could take to make the use of this doctrine more likely. Furthermore, the judiciary could, on its own initiative, cast aside its pattern of
excessive reliance on the form of transactions rather than on their substance. Below, Section A details a possible legislative approach, and
Section B investigates a judicial approach to achieving much-needed
reform.
A. Legislative Approach
In crafting remedial measures, Congress has sometimes cast a
wide net;137 other times, its methodology has been narrower.138 In addressing the problem of transfer tax abuse, Congress should follow the
same dual strategy: on the one hand, adopt a comprehensive approach
136. See Jeff Camarda, Estate Plan Secrets & How to Avoid Estate Tax (Part 1 of 2), FORBES
(Feb. 4, 2020, 12:01 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffcamarda/2020/02/04/estate-plan-secr
ets--how-to-avoid-estate-tax-part-1-of-2/ [https://perma.cc/R6HT-PH8W] (detailing ways to minimize the estate tax burden that a family endures); Jeff Camarda, Estate Plan Secrets & How to
Avoid Estate Tax (Part 2 of 2), FORBES (Feb. 4, 2020, 12:40 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
jeffcamarda/2020/02/04/estate-plan-secrets--how-to-avoid-estate-tax--part-2-of-2/ [https://perma
.cc/TZ6K-33TL] (same).
137. See, e.g., Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-147, §§ 501–
562, 124 Stat. 97, 97 (introduced as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act). This
legislation introduced a broad range of rules to ensure that U.S. taxpayers making foreign investments were tax compliant. Melissa A. Dizdarevic noted in her Comment that
[i]n an effort to crack down on offshore tax evasion, the United States is implementing
a new set of information reporting and withholding requirements on foreign banks and
other foreign entities. These provisions, known as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance
Act (FATCA) . . . require thirty percent withholding of the entity’s U.S.-source income,
unless they disclose specific information regarding their customers’ identities and account balances.
Melissa A. Dizdarevic, Comment, The FATCA Provisions of the Hire Act: Boldly Going Where
No Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2967, 2967 (2011).
138. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 469(a) (2018) (limiting the availability of passive losses to offset active
income).
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that has an overall chilling effect on planning of this sort; and, on the
other hand, embrace a targeted approach that eradicates known abuses.
A comprehensive approach to the problem of tax abuse is not uncharted territory. For example, in 2010, after learning about a litany of
tax-sheltering devices that taxpayers had employed to skirt their tax
obligations—devices with obscure acronymic names such as BOSS,
Son of BOSS, and COBRA139—Congress introduced Code section
7701(o), entitled “Clarification of the Economic Substance Doctrine.”140 This Code subsection provides a ringing endorsement of the
economic substance doctrine (a subset of the substance over form doctrine). In taking this legislative measure, Congress was able to accomplish two goals. First, it greatly strengthened the IRS’s ability to challenge those transactions lacking economic substance; and, second, it
provided safe refuge to those courts previously hesitant to rely upon
judicial doctrines in rendering their decisions.141
In other instances, Congress has not enacted such broad and
sweeping legislation but, instead, has chosen to attack specific instances of perceived income tax abuse. In Gitlitz v. Commissioner,142
for example, the Supreme Court upheld the taxpayer’s position that
notwithstanding the fact that cancellation of indebtedness income is
excludable under section 108, it nevertheless constituted an “item of
income” that increases an S corporation shareholder’s stock basis under section 1366(a)(1)(A).143 Sensing the possibility of near-term
horizon abuse (namely, no income recognition yet a tax basis

139. For a nice overview of how tax professionals designed these tax-circumvention strategies,
see Del Wright Jr., Financial Alchemy: How Tax Shelter Promoters Use Financial Products to
Bedevil the IRS (and How the IRS Helps Them), 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611 (2013).
140. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409(a),
124 Stat. 1029, 1067.
141. See, e.g., Rebecca Rosenberg, Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine: Substantive Impact and Unintended Consequences, 15 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 55, 55–58 (2019) (offering a
general explanation of how Code section 7701(o) operates and the broad implications it has had in
promoting tax compliance); Bret Wells, Economic Substance Doctrine: How Codification Changes
Decided Cases, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 411, 428–51 (2010) (predicting the effects that this legislation
would have on future tax litigation).
142. 531 U.S. 206 (2001).
143. Id. at 213–14.
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increase),144 Congress quickly amended Code section 108(d)(7)(A) to
preclude this outcome.145
When it comes to income tax abuses, Congress has thus demonstrated a low tolerance level for activities of this sort. This same congressional attitude should extend to transfer tax abuses: employing the
identical playbook, it should craft both broad and targeted legislation
designed to curtail anticipated and existing transfer tax abuses. Consider the proposed mechanics of each approach.
Insofar as a broad approach is concerned, Congress, using Code
section 7701(o) as a model, could fashion legislation that would be
applicable to gratuitous transfers. Engrafted onto 7701 and introduced
as subsection (p), such legislation might read as follows:
(p) Clarification of the Application of the Substance over
Form Doctrine to Transfer Tax Transactions
Absent a specific Congressional provision to the contrary, in
cases involving any transaction that has as one of its primary
purposes the defeat of taxes assessed under Chapter 11, 12,
or 13 of the Code (relating to the estate, gift, and generationskipping transfer tax) or that has as one of its purposes the
diminution of capital gains taxes assessed under Chapter 1 of
the Code (relating to income taxes), courts should employ the
substance over form doctrine and accord an outcome consistent with the taxpayer’s actual objectives.
In the sphere of estate planning, such a sweeping legislative initiative would have a significant impact. By applying the substance over
form doctrine, the IRS, notwithstanding the existence of Crummey
powers (i.e., limited withdrawal rights), could deem taxpayers who
made trust contributions as having made future-interest gifts. And because no taxpayer purposely seeks to destroy the value of her property,
the agency could disallow valuation discounts related to intrafamily
144. See James F. Loebl, Does the Excluded COD Income of an Insolvent S Corporation Increase the Basis of Shareholders’ Stock?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 957, 957–58 (2000) (under these circumstances, explaining the controversial nature of according a tax basis increase to a shareholder’s
stock interest); Gregg D. Polsky, Another Gitlitz Windfall: Double Basis Increases for S Corp.
Shareholders?, 92 TAX NOTES 314 (2001) (same).
145. Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21, 40
(2002). This is not an isolated instance of Congress trying to plug the metaphoric revenue dike
against tax abuse leaks; to the contrary, the nation’s legislative body routinely engages in exercises
of this sort. See, e.g., Scott Marc Kolbrenner, Derivatives Design and Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV.
211, 253 (1995) (“By enacting section 1092 of the Code, Congress sought to prevent taxpayer abuse
of straddles, trading methods whereby a taxpayer owns offsetting positions but only realizes the
loss (not the gain) until it is to his advantage to realize the gain.”).
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property transfers. Finally, it could ignore upstream transfers and treat
such transfers as if they were made directly to the transferor’s intended
beneficiary (or not made at all, in the case of purported gifts that revert
to the original transferor) rather than to the intermediary straw person
being used to achieve a tax basis step-up. Going forward, estate planners who devised elaborate schemes designed to circumvent income
or transfer tax obligations would have to consider whether such strategies could withstand the heightened scrutiny that proposed Code section 7701(p) would provide.
But many members of Congress might be hesitant to empower the
IRS with a statutory weapon of this sort. If this turns out to be the case,
Congress could instead fashion legislation designed to nullify each
particular tax-minimization strategy. On many different occasions, academics have specifically suggested targeted legislative measures that
would put an end to Crummey trusts,146 valuation discounts related to
intrafamily transfers of business interests,147 upstream planning,148
and a host of other planning devices.149 To date, however, such proposals have languished, provoking no congressional response.
While Congress should seriously consider instituting the proposed targeted measures, it might be more productive if it also adopted
the broader, more general legislative approach. This is because a caseby-case approach forces the IRS to play catchup rather than positioning the agency to challenge newly minted transfer tax–avoidance
schemes as they arise.
B. Judicial Approach
Even a cursory review of Part II of this analysis reveals that, when
necessary, courts are adept at using the substance over form doctrine
to reach their decisions. The question is how to nudge judges to extend
this mode of thinking into the transfer tax realm. This seems mostly a
146. See, e.g., Arash, supra note 59, at 126 (“Given such blatant abuse of the annual exclusion
for purposes of gift and estate tax avoidance, a revision in the tax law is necessary to deter taxpayers
from engaging in such tax avoidance schemes.”).
147. See, e.g., Fellows & Painter, supra note 69, at 932 (offering “statutory amendments to the
Internal Revenue Code to prevent unwarranted tax avoidance of the wealth transfer taxes [via valuation discounts]”).
148. See, e.g., Jay A. Soled, Upstream Tax Planning: A Case Study of Why Congress Should
Institute a General Anti-Abuse Rule, 99 N.C. L. REV. 643, 643 (2021) (attacking upstream tax planning as favoring form over substance).
149. See Dodge, supra note 74, at 1014–15 (recommending the statutory elimination of dynasty
trusts, which are specifically designed to circumvent the legislative intent of levying a transfer tax
once at every generational level).
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matter of exhortation: on their own initiative, judges can and should
carve a new path—that other courts might find logically inviting and
structurally sound—moored to the substance over form doctrine. After
all, a flair for creativity has been a trademark of the federal judiciary.
Examples include the assignment of income doctrine,150 the independent investor test,151 the significant future benefit metric,152 and other
judicial measures153 that have sprung from the creative minds of innovative jurists.
It is worth noting that the root of all of our examples of transfer
tax abuses involves a purported transfer to one party that is truly intended for another. In the case of Crummey trusts, the Crummey withdrawal power holders are not the intended beneficiaries of the trust
contribution, at least not immediately; rather, the trust itself is the beneficiary.154 In the case of fractional property interest transfers, the intention is that the named recipients subrogate their personal agendas
for those of the family unit, which, as a whole, is the true recipient.155
And in the case of upstream tax planning, depending upon how this
arrangement is structured, the intended beneficiary is not the older
family individual or trust beneficiary who is the purported donee, but
rather the donor himself, a younger family member, or the trust remainder beneficiaries.156
In recognition of the fact that transfer tax abuse often involves
camouflaging the true beneficiary of a gratuitous transfer, one or more
members of the judiciary should unpeel these synthetic layers of gratuitous and testamentary transfers. On the basis of the substance over
form doctrine (or, materially the same approach, but by some other
moniker such as the “proper beneficiary identification doctrine”), a
thoughtful judge should examine the true essence of every transfer and
insist that it be taxed accordingly. In Estate of Grace,157 for example,
the U.S. Supreme Court laid the seeds for this principle by formulating
the reciprocal trust doctrine—recognizing that the true trust
150. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1930).
151. Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r, 196 F.3d 833, 838–39 (7th Cir. 1999).
152. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 87 (1992).
153. See, e.g., Daniel M. Schneider, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Federal Tax Cases Decided
by Trial Courts, 1993–2006: A Quantitative Assessment, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 35, 58–69 (2009)
(presenting empirical data regarding the robust use of various judicial doctrines in tax jurisprudence).
154. See supra Section III.A.
155. See supra Section III.B.
156. See supra Section III.C.
157. 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
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beneficiary of each trust was not the one actually designated in the
trust instrument but rather the trust grantor himself/herself.158
Were the judiciary to invoke the substance over form doctrine or
some formulation of the same, many of the principal transfer tax abuse
schemes would fail. Transfers to irrevocable trusts would no longer
qualify as present interests; valuation discounts related to intrafamily
transfers would disappear; and, in the case of upstream tax planning,
the initial trust beneficiary’s supposed indicia of ownership would be
ignored as mere subterfuge, and the contributed trust assets would thus
retain their carryover tax basis.
Application of the substance over form doctrine or a newly
crafted/named judicial doctrine that is similar in nature would not
eliminate all transfer tax abuses, but its application would be a significant step in the right direction. In the transfer tax realm, this would
bring much-needed consistency to the judicial enterprise of meting out
justice fairly and equitably.
VI. CONCLUSION
For over a century, the nation has relied upon its transfer tax regime as a source of revenue and mitigation of wealth concentrations.159 However, its ability to fulfill its historic missions has been
hampered by the fact that the judiciary has been reluctant to apply the
substance over form doctrine to challenge a wide range of transfer taxmitigation schemes. The consequences of the judiciary’s inaction have
been severe: utilization of these techniques significantly narrows the
transfer tax base, enabling billions of dollars of wealth to pass free of
transfer tax and allowing wealth concentrations to abound.160
158. See Elena Marty-Nelson, Taxing Reciprocal Trusts: Charting a Doctrine’s Fall from
Grace, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1781, 1781 (1997) (extolling the virtues of the reciprocal trust doctrine,
explaining that “[w]hen settlors began creating ‘crossed trusts’ to evade estate tax liability, the
Internal Revenue Service obtained Supreme Court precedent in United States v. Estate of Grace
allowing it to tax the ‘economic reality’ of such trusts”).
159. See James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 852 (2001)
(explaining the need to retain the estate tax to reduce wealth concentrations); Carlyn S. McCaffrey
& John C. McCaffrey, Our Wealth Transfer Tax System—A View from the 100th Year, 41 ACTEC
L.J. 1, 9 (2015) (“The 1916 Congressional debates show that 59% of the supporters of the tax did
so because of the need for revenue combined with a belief that using an estate tax to raise needed
revenue was a fair way to do it.”).
160. See, e.g., David Joulfaian, What Do We Know About the Behavioral Effects of the Estate
Tax?, 57 B.C. L. REV. 843, 858 (2016) (“The estate tax base has been eroded considerably by the
expanded exemption and other preferences introduced over the past several decades. . . . Despite
its narrow tax base, the estate tax continues to contribute to the progressivity of the tax system,
albeit with a diminished capacity.”).
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To restore the integrity of the transfer tax system, this analysis
calls for a legislative and/or judicial approach to resolving the issue of
transfer tax schemes that lack substance. One option is for Congress,
via legislation, to endorse the use of the substance over form doctrine
in the transfer tax context. The other option is for the judiciary to utilize the substance over form doctrine to undo transactions that are
wholly synthetic in nature.
By enabling the substance over form doctrine to become an integral part of the transfer tax regime, Congress and the judiciary would
simultaneously enhance revenue collection and decrease wealth inequality. And with the nation’s deficit raging at an all-time-high161 and
wealth inequality rampant,162 these are outcomes that each should actively pursue.

161. Martin Crutsinger, U.S. Budget Deficit Hits All-Time High of $3.1 Trillion, PBS (Oct. 16,
2020, 2:23 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/u-s-budget-deficit-hits-all-time-high-of3-1-trillion [https://perma.cc/FL99-KZES].
162. Tommy Beer, Top 1% of U.S. Households Hold 15 Times More Wealth than Bottom 50%
Combined, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2020, 5:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2020/
10/08/top-1-of-us-households-hold-15-times-more-wealth-than-bottom-50-combined/
[https://
perma.cc/TGB3-P759].
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